Let's Stop the Chamberlain Myth!

I'm going to step on my soapbox. People who say Neville Chamberlain is one of the worst clearly buy into the "Peace in our Time" mythos that still prevades today, or remember John Cleese playing him in the BBC 50th anniversary dramatisations.

if I can defend the poor man Chamberlain who seems to be getting a bit of a bad reputation ealier in this thread. Yes, the man knew Hitler was dangerous but he also knew in 1938 (pre-and post Munich) that Britain had not sufficiently recovered enough from the Great Depression and the horrors of the last World War to mantain another campaign. Plus, it must be noted that by 1938 many still held the view of Lord Lothian that "Hitler was only going into his backyard." (The Rhineland was militirised but it was Germanic territory and was also incidentally passed off as a reaction to the Franco-Russian 1935 treaty which Hitler took as threat and increased the possibility of "encirclement", the Anschluss achieved but these were two Germanic peoples coming together seemingly out of a mutual want for such alliances).

REASONS for APPEASEMENT
1. Anxieties about Mussolini's aggrandisement in the Mediterranean and the poor state of the British defences.
2. In addition the British government expected that appeasement should be the first policy for rational people to follow. (And Hitler, despite being dangerous and hungry, was a tactical thinker who claimed to only want what was best for Germany so it could be assumed he was rational). That is that the attempt to find a negotitated compromise to resolve disputes was only reasonable and infinetly preferable to war.
3. Also the British Public recalled WW1 with horror and did not want to repeat what was by then called the "the great mistake of 1914."
4. The Chiefs of Staff were also right to warn against rashly entering a war without being prepared. We would lose.
5. There was also the question of economy. Britain was slowly recovering from the Great Depression and the people wanted wellfare not warfare. Besides there was thr argument that rearmament would itself make war more likely.
6. Moreover, if we were to rearm we needed time to do so!
7. War with Nazi Germany and the fall of Hitler would, it was feared, lead to the rise of Communism in Germany. This was viewed as a greater threat than Nazism. Hitler was still hoped to be a possible "bulwark against the westward expansion of Communism". The persecution of minorities was not then known of widely outside of Germany.
8. The Commonwealth Leaders - Menzies, Hertzog and MacKenzie King, - warned that thier domestic preoccupations would preclude them supporting Britain in another war in Central Europe.
9. The British Public still placed its hopes in the League of Nations.
10. Lack of allies. Mussolini we had alienated over Abyssinia, the US were unintrested in the War at this point, Russia we were too suspicious of, and France "can not hold a secret for a half hour or a government for a six months." (Chamberlain)

By the 1930s the British public regarded Versailles as unduly harsh and thought that lasting peace would not be achieved until Germany had been given justice, self-determination and equal treatment. It was hoped that controlled and just concessions would make Germany a safe European neighbour and a partner against Communism.

The anti-appeasement view for pre-1939 is a triumph for naive optimism rather than cynical realism. Chamberlain had not wanted to react to the Anschluss, despite the fact it was a clear breach of Versailles, for reasons of geography - we could not easily access Austria! - and because Hitler assured everyone this was his "last demand". Besides, the official opposition to the British government, the Labour party, had at this time a very unhelpfully contradictory policy of hostility to the Fascist dictators AND to the possibilities of rearmament! Labour rhetoric clouded the issue (no change there then!). Plus the whole thing (Anschluss wise) was over before we could act on it, and an Austrian referrendum gave an overwhelming support for the union. Liberal Leader Sir Archibald Sinclair on the 14th March 1938 told the Commons,

"During these recent crises in the affairs of the world, many of us have begged the Government to make a stand, and stop the retreat of the Democracies against the advance of the Dictatorships, but Honorable Members have shouted, "You want war! You must be careful!"...So we see the Democracies still on the retreat before the Dictatorships. We see, through the hail of bombs, and the rumbling of tanks, the tide of anarchy and confusion rising and engulfing civilisation."

However, Chamberlain accurately responded to such charges that "The hard fact is that nothing could have arrested what actually happened unless this country AND other countries were prepared to use force!". Sinclair may have been prepared to use force, but the British public weren't as they regarded Sinclair's rhetoric as cheap and easy for the opposition but dangerous for an actual government.

Some other post-Munich settlement (September 1938) points
1. The Resolution of the Czechoslovakia crisis was a massive success for Chamberlain in Britain, who had at some cost had preserved bruised reason and peace through judicious concessions. That Christmas the Chamberlain doll was the most popular present for young girls (Can you imagine the Tony Blair doll selling out today?)
2. The much mocked-peace of paper served to show everyone "Look! Hitler has in writing said HE WILL DO NO MORE, so IF/WHEN HE DOES go further (as Chamberlain suspected he might, what with an undefended Czechoslovakia - thanks to the German taking of the Sudetenland - resting on Hitler's promise not to conquer) then everyone sees this proof that the man can not be trusted. It was a very well executed PR stunt. Unfortunately the whole "peace in our time" quoute from the later Downing Street speech (written by Halifax, Chamberlain later said that as soon as he read that quote aloud, he knew his reputation had been sealed. And all because he was too tired from a long flight to proofread) has clouded the issue.
3. Churchill said of the settlement, "Our government had to choose between shame and war. They choose shame, and they will get war too."
4. Said Clement Atlee (Labour leader), "Today we have seen a proud and civilised country taken and fallen to despoted barbarianism." (Convienent, since the man opposed rearmament!)
5. After Munich, realizing that time was running short, Chamberlain authorised the immediate and rapid rearmament and building up of supplies - realizing the Hitler situation was leading only one way.


It is possible to condemn Chamberlain as niave. However, Chamberlain was not fooled by Hitler and did not trust him as seen above. He hoped Hitler might keep his word but privately refered to him as "half-mad" and later said "Hitler misinterpreted our understanding for weakness." His optimistic comments about "peace with honour", which he was the next day to tone down for the Commons, adding "not to read too much into words used in a moment of some emotion after a long and exhausting day" were for public consumption only. The public wanted peace and they had to be shown that if war came it was Hitler's fault and the British government had done everything possible to prevent it. Chamberlain's actions show what he really thought. (ie the rearmament post-Munich!)

Good lord, I've been arguing for a wee while there - I hope I shed some light on the situation for people, but case in point just remember: Chamberlain was also a dying man when he undertook all of this, his attempts to do everything for this country even flying to Munich and back whilst ill, brought about his death of cancer by 1940. And yet, he undertook everything possible to keep the world from the brink of war and the fact that he in the end failed should not be held against the man.