More on Chamberlain

Chamberlain played the diplomacy game and used the Czechs. Since he heavily publicised this "pact" with Hitler, it swiftly became clear to everyone that the man was untrustworthy. You have to remember in September 1939, most of Europe hoped to avoid a war, thought Hitler was a nice guy who got a wee bit carried away righting the wrongs of the "injust Versailles" and who could be used to block the Westward expansion of Communism. There was only about two dissenting voices in Britain, Churchill and Boothby. It was Hitler's taking of the Czechs that proved once and for all this search for living space wasn't going to be justifiable anymore. (It wasn't Germans getting self-determination anymore, or the old Anschluss reuniting trick).

When it comes to Czechoslovakia in 1938, Neville Chamberlain could either

A) Play for time. Get it known Hitler has promised this is his last demand. Then, when he invades anyway, the world will know what this man is like. Know that your country is not able to fight a war in 38, you do not have the supplies. The "show the world if you can trust Hitler" gambit gives country enough time to rearm. Ignore Labour party because they want to oppose the Facists AND rearmament, and thus are confusing things.

B) trust Hitler. Very doubtful Chamberlain did so. If he had, rearmament and stock building for the Navy, RAF and army would not have started as soon as he got back. Also, he did write in one of his diary entries for March'38 "Herr Hitler is not a trustworthy man", suggesting he could see through the veneer of "respectability" the man seemed to hold.

c) Go to War immediately. The worst choice, mainly because we didn't have the supplies! We needed that whole year to build up our forces. Going to war in September 1938 would have been disasterous. We couldnt have done it without the aid of our Commonwealth allies,and they all made excuses about home affairs. The head of the army (his name slips my mind) specifically told Chamberlain and his Cabinet that in no certain times was it possible for Britain to win any war with Germany in 38. The year gained by Munich was vital to the bigger picture.

There was also a geography problem. You want to go help the Czechs? How you going to get there from Britain exactly? Through Germany? Nope. Through the Med and passing Germany's then ally, Italy? Nope. Through Russia? Thats the only country we trust less! We'd have been stuck wagging our little finger.


Chamberlain chose A. It was the only logical choice he could make. And history proved him right, didn't it? Hitler invaded the Czechs, going against his word, public perception to him plummeted, and our army grew in strength to the point where a war wouldnt have been a disasterous defeat. Going anyother route would have meant earlier war, probably defeat, and who wants to speculate on a history of the world from 1940 onwards with a victorious Hitler.

Churchill and Chamberlain clearly had different ideas on how to get around the Nazis - Churchill was a bit of a drunk hotheaded manic depressive, after all - but they seem to have shared many of the same aspirations and ideas. They did, after all, work in the War Cabinet together in a number of occassions before Chamberlains death.

Thats the upshot of the Czech crisis. And we'd look more fondly on Chamberlain too, if it wasn't for that stupid Halifax scripted speech he gave the night he arrived back in the country. Peace in our time, oh dear. As soon as those words come off the page in front of him and out his mouth, Chamberlain knew his legacy was sealed.

I don't know if you can tell I'm a big admirer of the man, I think he's a fascinating person and one of the more likeable if flawed PM's we've had.